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ABSTRACT 
The election of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote were widely hailed as examples of (white) working 
class revolts. This article examines the populist racialisation of the working class as white and ‘left 
behind’, and representative of the ‘people’ or ‘demos’, in the campaigns and commentaries. We argue 
that such constructions made race central, obscured the class make-up, allowed for the re-assertion 
of white identity as a legitimate political category and legitimised, mainstreamed and normalised 
racism and the far right. Moreover, it delegitimised Black, Minority Ethnic and immigrant experiences 
and interests, including working class ones. We show that the construction of the votes as (white) 
working class revolts, and representing the 'people' and/or 'demos', is based on a partial reading of 
electoral data, misrepresents the votes, stigmatises the working class, and supports an ideological 
purpose which maintains the racial, political and economic status quo.  
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While much of the west has witnessed a resurgence of the far right since the end of the 2000s, 2016 
marked a new step in the mainstreaming of reactionary and particularly racist, Islamophobic and 
xenophobic political movements, agendas and discourses (Mondon and Winter 2017). Amongst 
others, the Brexit victory in the United Kingdom and Donald Trump’s election to the Presidency in the 
United States have demonstrated that these movements, agendas and discourses can now win key 
electoral battles. While much has already been written on these two cases and events, the aim of this 
article is to focus the discussion on the construction of the white working class to promote racist 
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agendas, adding to a limited, but growing analysis (Bhambra 2017, Emejulu 2016, Lentin 2017, 
Mondon 2017, Nadeem et al. 2017, Saini 2017, Virdee and McGeever 2017, Winter 2017). Our 
contribution and aim is three-fold: first, to interrogate the construction of these votes, specifically as 
white working class revolts; second, demonstrate that the prevalent mainstream explanations about 
the rise of a (white) working class reaction is based on an ideological racialised construction of the 
working class and skewed reading of data in both cases that do not sustain even basic scrutiny; third, 
that such explanations and skewered data reproduce and even support a particular discourse and 
political agenda, legitimising Trump and Brexit, as well as racism and xenophobia, and delegitimising 
the working class, whether consciously or not. 
 
To achieve so, this article examines this mainstreaming of racism, focusing on the transformation of 
the discourses and rhetoric about race and class. Particular attention is paid to the populist 
racialisation of the working class as white and indigenous in the Brexit and Trump campaigns. In doing 
so, the aim of this article is not to explain the reasons behind the vote for Trump or Brexit, but rather 
to examine such explanations and how these reproduce or even support a particular discourse and 
political agenda. The first section provides some context to highlight and examine the ways in which 
Brexit and the election of Trump were constructed as working class revolts in mainstream elite and 
populist discourse, essentialising the working class as white (but also predominantly male), and 
positing it as a reactionary proxy for the embodiment of the ‘people’ and, following from this, these 
votes as a reactionary proxy for revolution. To challenge such a deeply anchored narrative, the article 
takes a two-pronged approach: first, it demonstrates that the construction of these events as working 
class revolts, ignores the diversity of the working class to promote an essentialist narrative based on 
white identity, experience and interests. The article then moves on to challenge the fact that these 
votes were in fact working class by examining voting patterns and results and highlighting that such 
claims rest not only on exaggerations, but ideological assumptions and political agendas which 
reaffirm the campaigns. Finally, the article discusses the implications of such constructions, claims and 
narratives and how they reproduce, reaffirm or even support particular political discourses and 
agendas based in pre-existing power and privilege. 
 
White working class revolt(s)? 
 
In October 2016, as the US election loomed, Farage (2016) wrote in an opinion piece in The Telegraph, 
a symbol of his media prominence: 
 
The similarities between the different sides in this election are very like our own recent battle. As the 
rich get richer and big companies dominate the global economy, voters all across the West are being 
left behind. The blue-collar workers in the valleys of South Wales angry with Chinese steel dumping 
voted Brexit in their droves. In the American rust belt, traditional manufacturing industries have 
declined, and it is to these people that Trump speaks very effectively…. 
 
This kind of statement was not limited to far-right politicians claiming political support from the 
working class, but had become common in much of the political commentary in 2016. To provide key 
context, the aim of this section is to present and examine a selection of statements and analyses from 
political actors, the media and intellectuals to illustrate the way in which Brexit and Trump’s election 
were constructed as working class revolts. For The New Statesman, Trump and Brexit were ‘a working 
class revolt’ (Crampton 2016). In March 2016, Fox News called Trump ‘the working-class candidate’ 
(Fox News 2016). In the UK, The Daily Express talked about a ‘working class revolution’ (Gutteridge 
2016) and Spiked! (2016) claimed ‘The Brexit vote was a revolt against the establishment’, its editor 
arguing that argued that ‘Britain’s poor and workless have risen up’ (O’Neill 2016). In The Guardian, 
John Harris (2016) claimed that ‘Britain is in the midst of a working-class revolt’’. In The New York 
Times, David Brooks (2016) referred to Trump’s election as a ‘revolt of the masses’, while Cohn (2016) 
claimed that Trump ‘won working class whites’. 
 
Much of the narrative which followed both the election of Trump and Brexit has been based on murky 
definitional grounds: the so-called ‘working class’ is usually painted as the socio-economically and 
politically disenfranchised and alienated, but also as essentially white and indigenous. This allows it to 
become at once particular as ‘white’ and ‘working class’ and universal as the ‘people’ or ‘demos’ (for 
the latter, see Todd 2015). While the populist character of the campaigns and their portrayal in the 
mainstream media pitted a constructed ‘people’ made up of workers against an out-of touch or 
contemptuous elite who fails to represent them, its nativist/racist/xenophobic basis pitted whites 
against classless immigrants, refugees and representatives of multiculturalism and diversity who 
threaten jobs, resources and nation. For Virdee and McGeever (2017) ‘This racializing nationalism has 
borne a particularly defensive character since the 2008 crisis. It is defined not by imperial prowess or 
superiority, but by a deep sense of loss of prestige; a retreat from the damaging impact of a globalized 
world that is no longer recognizable, no longer British’. This operates through what has been described 
by Song (2014) as a culture of racial equivalence: this ‘post-race’ narrative does not negate race or 
racism, but allows for the discursive placement of whiteness in a position where it has lost its historical 
power (globally and domestically) and appears thus in decline, vulnerable and subject to victimisation 
by others.2 This narrative and the identification of whiteness with the working class, negates its 
privilege and renders it the ‘people’. 
 
In the UK, while the Conservative-led Vote Leave was the official campaign for Brexit, the UKIP-led 
Leave.EU received much coverage as Nigel Farage had been instrumental in leading the agenda on the 
issue since the 2014 European election. The nationalist argument was central to the campaign as 
demonstrated by its slogan: ‘We want our country back: VOTE TO LEAVE ON 23RD JUNE’. For Farage, 
Brexit was a victory for ‘ordinary people, for good people, for decent people’ (Peck 2016), one which 
confirmed that concerns over immigration, as well as Islam, came first and economic grievances 
second (Hall and Maddox 2016). Often, the Leave.EU campaign tapped into far right strategies, most 
notably with its use of a Nazi-esque image of refugees crossing from Croatia to Slovenia in 2015, with 
a banner reading ‘Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all’ (Stewart and Mason 2016). It was therefore 
not surprising to see the far right rally behind Farage (Lyons 2016). 
 
Trump’s campaign was similar to Leave.EU, and UKIP’s more generally, and targeted post-industrial 
‘red states’ traditionally associated with conservative white working-class constituencies, combining 
protectionist rhetoric with anti-immigration tropes. His slogan, ‘Make America Great Again’ was a nod 
to an idealised industrial period of plentiful jobs, economic security and implied cultural security, but 
also a dog whistle to nostalgia for a pre-PC, pre-affirmative action and even pre-civil rights era when 
white men ruled unchallenged. As Anderson (2016, 161) points out, less than a month after Dylann 
Roof killed nine African-Americans at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, 
South Carolina, Trump told an audience at a GOP nomination rally ‘Don’t worry, we’ll take our country 
back’. On election day, he declared: ‘Today the American working class is going to strike back, finally’ 
(Cohn 2016). Trump’s nostalgia and assertations that he and his target base would take back the 
country and strike back, linked to his racist, Islamophobia and xenophobic rhetoric and proposed 
policies to do this, racialised the working class as white, with a right to the nation’s past and future 
over others. This made it unsurprising that he received endorsements from the far right. This included 
Rocky Suhayda of the American Nazi Party, Don Black of Stormfront (Neiwert and Posner 2016), ‘Alt-
Right’ figurehead Richard Spencer and former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan David Duke, as well 
as more mainstream right wing gateway figures and white nationalist enablers from Breitbart such as 
Steve Bannon and Milo Yiannopoulos (Winter 2017, 2018). 
 
                                                          
2 For more on the post-racial white backlash, see: Hughley 2014 and Winter 2018. 
While the far right in both the US and UK benefitted from the racialisation of the working class, it was 
more surprisingly taken up by part of the left, who made tackling immigration a key issue (Wearing 
2017; Bush 2015; Travis 2009). For Labour MP Emma Reynolds, the message was clear: ‘Trump and 
Brexit show that progressives cannot take white working-class voters for granted’. A number of 
academic analyses also participated in either reproducing, constructing or informing the narrative. 
Arguments about the white working class ‘left-behind’ became common to explain the resurgence of 
far right parties as it was argued right-wing populist were able to attract former left-wing voters 
alienated by the convergence of the mainstream left and right and their focus on the middle class. 
According to Ford and Goodwin (2017), support for Brexit is to be found within the working-class ‘left-
behind’ who fear a loss of order and identity in ‘a more diverse and rapidly changing Britain’, 
championed by a homogenised and mythologised social liberal elite. A similar argument was 
developed by Goodhart (2013) who argued that increased diversity, through mass immigration, 
threatened social solidarity for the ‘somewhere’ in opposition to the rootless, socially liberal, middle-
class, cosmopolitan ‘anywhere’ Goodhart (2017). 
 
In the US, Vance (2017) argues that one must look at the economic and cultural crisis of the white 
working and underclass in rural America to understand Trump’s support and victory. Hochschild 
(2016) foregrounds the ‘cultural’ in terms of race, gender and sexuality, arguing that, ‘To white, native-
born, heterosexual men,… [Trump] offered a solution to the dilemma they had long faced as the ‘left 
behinds’ of the 1960s and 1970s celebration of other identities. As Bhambra (2017) argued, 
‘methodological whiteness’ has distorted social scientific analysis of Brexit and Trump: ‘[t]he politics 
of both campaigns was also echoed in those social scientific analyses that sought to focus on the 
“legitimate” claims of the “left behind” or those who had come to see themselves as “strangers in 
their own land”’, as Hochschild phrases it, both racialised as white. This, we argue, not only accepts 
but legitimises the narrative of loss, disenfranchisement and victimisation, but also that of its original 
entitlement and the nationalism and racism that underpins and flows from it. This trend in academia 
is not new. As Hill (2004, 9) suggested, ‘Recent scholarship on race has increasingly turned into the 
historical pressures now besetting the fiction Americans still insist on calling the white race. In doing 
so, it has marked the same attention to whiteness that made it possible for AR’s [American 
Renaissance’s] men to echo’. It was at AR that Hill (2004, 5–6) met the BNP’s Nick Griffin who was 
targeting the white working-class vote in Britain at that time, notably in post-industrial former labour 
strongholds, before UKIP replaced them. 
 
The assumption that the alienation suffered by the white working class has translated into a strong 
opposition to immigration and diversity has led some commentators to argue that the liberal elite’s 
reaction and general anti-racist attitudes are in fact contempt towards the democratic voice of 
‘ordinary people’. This was expressed by Kaufmann (2017) in his report ‘Racial self-interest’ is not 
racism where he argued that Brexit was an expression of white, particularly working class, racial self-
interest (what Goodhart terms ‘White Identity Politics’). For Kaufmann, it is crucial to ‘avoid using 
charges of racism to side-line discussions of ethno-demographic interests’ in relation to issues such as 
opposition to immigration. According to Goodhart, cited in the report, ‘The liberal reflex to tar 
legitimate majority grievances with the brush of racism risks deepening western societies’ cultural 
divides’. 
 
The conflation of anti-racism and elitism, and the representation of the white working class as the 
victims of elite anti-racism which slips between racialised classism and reverse racism is also central 
to the libertarian right’s approach to Brexit and Trump. Online magazine Spiked! has been particularly 
active in developing this line of argumentation. As Furedi (2016) declared: 
 
In the eyes of too many Remain strategists, the uneducated working classes have few 
redeeming qualities. They were frequently portrayed as parochial xenophobes who hate 
immigrants, who hold on to outdated values, and who fear uncertainty and change. In the 
aftermath of the referendum, the hatred directed at ‘those 
people’ … has intensified. 
 
Such argumentation is often accompanied by articulations and justifications of alleged working-class 
concerns about immigration and limits on free speech, most notably so-called ‘political correctness’. 
Like Furedi, Milo Yiannopoulos (2017) claimed that ‘Liberals have lots of theories for why working class 
whites abandoned them. The most obvious of which is their old standby, “they are racist”’. It is 
frequently framed as a response to commentators who express concern about a link between Brexit, 
Trump and racism, while it is in fact the response itself which reifies the link. This in turn places the 
blame squarely on the working class rather than on the campaigns, the way they are covered and the 
diversity of supporters. 
 
Pushed to its extreme, this argument both served to delegitimise well documented evidence of spikes 
in far-right activities and racist attacks created by the referendum and the US election by making it 
about elite classism (Weaver 2016; Travis 2016; Hatewatch Staff 2016a, 2016b; Farmer 2017; 
Hatewatch Staff 2017;Miller and Werner 2016). Spiked!’s Luke Gittos (2016) claimed that ‘the onset 
of panic has revealed how the very publications and commentators who once claimed to stand up for 
the working class in fact view working-class people as a violent, racist horde’. In these cases, the 
commentators ignore the mainstreaming of racism and it is themselves who seem to think that the 
working class is white, are responsible for Brexit and Trump, speak as or for the people and democracy, 
and are the target of accusations of racism. To explore this further, we now move to examine and 
challenge the concept of whiteness and construction of the white working class, as well as such 
narratives. 
 
Who are the (white) working class? 
 
This section examines and interrogates the concept, construction and narrative of the white working-
class revolt around Brexit and Trump. There is no doubt that the working class in Britain and America 
faces great inequality in a post-industrial context following the 2010 economic crisis, growing neo-
liberal policies, deregulation, housing crises, austerity in the UK, and an opioid epidemic in the US. 
That said, the racialised construction of the working class as white, or merely the focus on the ‘white 
working class’, in revolt against the establishment presents a number of issues. The first, is the fact 
that the working class is not white and that the socio-economic inequality and political 
disenfranchisement they experience is also experienced, often to a greater degree, by Black and 
Minority Ethnic working class people. This construction and narrative thus ignores this 
intersectionality, white privilege and the effects of such racialised divide and rule on communities. 
It is a distraction from an actual anti-establishment critique of and revolt against entrenched power. 
Linked to this, the white working class is subject to historically contingent definitions of whiteness and 
racialised or ethnicised divisions (e.g. Jewish, Polish and Irish Catholic), often around immigration, 
labour and reactionary political movements and ideologies. Thirdly, if we consider that the working 
class being discussed is only white and the fact that the Trump and Brexit campaigns were led by 
figureheads from elite and establishment backgrounds, such as Trump, Farage and Boris Johnson, as 
well as discourses of general white and national decline, it appears that it was whiteness, national 
identification and indigenous status that was at stake as opposed to socio-economic status or class. 
 
According to Virdee (in Patel 2015), 
 
so much of the history and sociology of the working class of Britain had failed to integrate the 
experiences of the racialized fractions within this working class – the Irish Catholics, Jews, 
Asians and Caribbeans. It was almost as if the working assumption of these academics and 
socialist historians was that the working class was wholly white. 
 
In Race, Class and the Racialised Outsider, Virdee (2014) examines the ways in which racialised groups 
immigrated to Britain, were targeted racially and scapegoated, joined the working class and were 
central to working class history, the development of British industry, and the negotiation of both 
Britishness and whiteness. He argues that Jewish and Irish working-class subjects are particularly 
instructive: having entered the working class as racialised immigrant groups, they ‘became’ white, 
demonstrating the contingency of the concept of whiteness. 
 
The working class in the US has been shaped through a history of slavery and racism, immigration and 
specifically both external and internal labour migration (e.g. from Chinese rail workers, the migration 
of African-Americans from the Jim Crow South to the industrial North, and Mexican labourers) which 
informs a racialised class system and diverse working class. As a white settler colony, and while all 
white people come from elsewhere, some are whiter than others. Ignatiev (1995, 1996); Frye Jacobson 
(1998) and Roediger (1999) have all looked at whiteness as historical, contingent and constructed. 
Through their study of European migration to the United States, they have demonstrated how Jews, 
Irish, Catholics, Southern Italians and Greeks were racialised and excluded from whiteness, but 
eventually became white (a concept Jacobson terms ‘probationary whiteness’), through various 
historical processes, racial/racist differentiation, new waves of immigration and leaving the working 
class. Roediger (1999) argues that such groups only became white, in the Anglo-American sense, by 
distinguishing themselves from Black slaves and freemen, including in labour market competition. For 
Ignatiev (1996), the ability for them to become white Americans was linked to buying property outside 
the industrial working class cities and ghettos. This was not something afforded to African-Americans, 
Asians and Hispanic people. 
 
Returning to the present context, the construction and mobilisation of the white working class around 
Brexit did not go unnoticed or unchallenged. For the Runnymede Trust (Khan and Shaheen 2017), the 
racialisation of the working class and focus on white interests ignored the wider diversity of the 
working class and inequality faced by Black and minority ethnic communities, migrants and refugees. 
This divide and rule politics constructed a zero-sum competition for representation and reduced 
resources between the ‘indigenous’ white working class and ‘others’, even though socio-economic 
inequality and related problems (poverty, lack of social mobility, low wages, housing and institutional 
representation), predominantly represented as white working class problems, ‘cut across racial 
groups’, with ethnic minorities suffering the brunt of austerity politics (Khan 2017; see also 
Runnymede Trust 2015). Bassel and Emejulu (2017a, 2017b) also demonstrate the disproportionate 
effect of austerity on women of colour in their research on Britain and France. The gender aspect is 
important due to the fact that in the ‘left behind’ discourse, the post industrial working class is not 
only presumed to be white, but male. White men are posited as having lost their jobs, earning power, 
status and ability to support and protect their family and maintain their patriarchal and masculine 
power. 
 
This can be seen in the ways in which Brexit rhetoric intersected with fears of Muslims and particularly 
refugees threatening British women and children and the ways in which Trump’s support intersected 
with antifeminist, men’s rights and anti-PC sexist rhetoric. The latter of which was also linked to 
opposition to Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Support and voting patterns also highlight gender issues, 
particularly in relation to race, which we will return to in section three. In the United States, while de-
industrialisation and recession hurt the ‘rust-belt’ and ‘red states’ (code for white working class), Black 
and Hispanic people remained more likely to live in poorer neighbourhoods than white people with 
working class incomes (Goyette and Scheller 2016). Between 2007 and 2010 (recession), Hispanic 
wealth fell by 44%, and black wealth by 31%, compared to 11% for white families, and it was Black 
people who were more likely to be targeted and affected by subprime mortgages (Eisenbrey 2014). 
 
In contrast with this diversity, leaders of these movements were predominantly white, but not 
working class. The gap between the rhetoric and reality was made clearest when Farage and Trump, 
two wealthy businessmen, were pictured in a gold elevator in Trump Tower (Withnall 2016). 
Furthermore, cruder acts of racism regularly take place beyond the working class, as was the case with 
Rhodri Philipps, the 4th Viscount St Davids convicted in June 2017, for threatening and racist Facebook 
posts directed at prominent anti-Brexit activist Gina Miller and another man of immigrant background 
(BBC 2017). It is not surprising that this took place in a climate where newspapers owned by wealthy 
white men declared judges to be ‘enemies of the people’ for allowing MPs to have a say on triggering 
article 50 (Phipps 2016). 
 
Finally, despite claims by the campaigns and commentators that these votes were expressions of 
working class alienation and disenfranchisement, the focus of the campaigns was immigration, 
Islamophobia and national culture (often code for white), rather than jobs and economics. As 
previously noted, economics only came coupled with protectionist racism and xenophobia: ‘it was 
cultural anxiety – feeling like a stranger in America, supporting the deportation of immigrants, and 
hesitating about educational investment’ that best predicted white working class support for Trump 
(Green 2017). It was therefore white racist and not working class interests which were at stake. This 
raises the question which is the focus of the next section, who actually voted for Brexit and Trump and 
do they represent the working class and/or revolts? 
 
Brexit and Trump: working-class revolutions? 
 
In the previous section, we interrogated the construction of the ‘white working class’ historically, 
conceptually and sociologically. In this section, we test the mainstream narrative further by examining 
whether Brexit and Trump were indeed propelled by a white working-class revolt. Building on existing 
research (Runnymede Trust 2017), this section aims to demonstrate that while there is no denying 
that part of the working class did vote for Trump and Brexit, the mainstream narrative has exaggerated 
the importance of this vote, and downplayed other demographics such as race and gender. 
 
Despite widespread coverage, claims that Brexit was a working-class revolt are untenable when 
looking at the geography of the vote. As demonstrated by Dorling (2016) and Sayer (2017), Brexit 
supporters were mostly found in the wealthier parts of the UK, with 52% of leave voters being from 
southern half of England. Were it simply a question of class qua income for example, Scotland (62% 
remain) and Northern Ireland (55.8% remain), whose gross disposable income is lower than the UK’s 
average would have been fertile ground for Brexit. 
 
Analysis in terms of class provides further caveats to the working class revolt. While the ‘social grades’ 
categories of the National Readership Survey (2008) are notoriously problematic (see Rubin et al. 
2014), they remain the best tools at our disposal, but more importantly those used to create the 
narratives we are challenging. Using these and including abstention as a variable allows us to weaken 
such generalising claims further. Unfortunately, the Ashcroft poll (Lord 2016) does not provide 
estimates regarding abstention per social class, but applying the data available for the 2015 General 
Election regarding participation, while not ideal, raises some interesting caveats, the most obvious 
being the ignorance of abstention as an important vector in our democracies (Mondon 2017). The 
following results were thus calculated based on a similar rate of abstention within each, but adjusted 
with the overall turnout (27.8% vs 33.9%). With abstention taken into account, the difference between 
social classes is far less convincing as DE and C2 register a lower turnout than C1 and AB, leading the 
gap between C2 (42.34%) and AB (35.15%) to narrow from 21% to just 7%. With this calculation, the 
difference between C1 (38.25%) and DE (39.76%) becomes marginal, thus negating the working-class 
nature of the vote. This differential between classes is further negated when taking into account the 
size of each of these social classes within the entire population (see Figure 1): AB (9.49%) and C1 
(11.12%) become the largest purveyors of vote for Leave, above both C2 (9.02%) and DE (9.14%) (for 
more detail, see Mondon 2017, see also Dorling 2016). This more nuanced picture disproves further 
the idea that the poor/working class/ordinary people rose up against the well-off/elite.3 
 
FIGURE 1: Leave vote per social class. Source (Lord Ashcroft 24 June 2016, Ipsos Mori 2015, 
Mondon 2017) 
The picture is not dissimilar in the United States where the mainstream narrative about Trump’s 
victory can also be nuanced. An analysis of the exit polls conducted by Edison Research for the National 
Election Pool (New York Times 2017) does indeed point to a strong performance of Trump with poorly 
educated white men (see Tables 1 and 2). Compared to the data from 2012, the shift in terms of vote 
by income is also striking with a much lower gap between Clinton and Trump within the two lower 
categories, although it must be noted that the Democrat candidate still received a majority of the vote 
in these categories traditionally associated with the working-class. However, what is particularly 
interesting here, and conspicuously absent in much of the media coverage about the white working 
class revolt, is to compare Trump’s support with that of previous Republican candidates. While Trump 
did appeal to poorer voters in larger numbers than Mitt Romney or John McCain, his performance was 
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similar to George Bush Jr’s, thus suggesting that this may not be the working-class breakthrough 
widely advertised. 
 
Size of 
category 
in 2016 
2016 2012 2008 2004 
Clinton Trump Obama Romney Obama McCain Kerry Bush 
Under $30,000 17% 53% 41% 63% 35% 65% 32% 60% 40% 
$30,000 - 
$49,999 
19% 51% 42% 57% 42% 55% 43% 50% 49% 
$50,000 - 
$99,999 
31% 46% 50% 46% 52% 49% 49% 44% 56% 
$100,000 - 
$199,999 
24% 47% 48% 44% 54% 48% 51% 42% 57% 
$200,000 or 
more 
10% 47% 49% 44% 54% 52% 46% 35% 63% 
Table 1: vote in presidential election according to income 
The same seems to be true about education. Romney and McCain did particularly poorly against 
Obama within the least educated voter categories, making Trump’s appeal within these categories 
appear like a real breakthrough. However, Trump’s performance is again far less exceptional when 
compared to Bush’s in 2004. 
 
Size of 
category 
in 2016 
2016 2012 2008 2004 
Clinton Trump Obama Romney Obama McCain Kerry Bush 
Some 
college/associate 
degree 
32% 43% 52% 49% 48% 51% 47% 46% 54% 
College graduate 32% 49% 45% 47% 51% 50% 48% 46% 52% 
Postgraduate 
study 
18% 58% 37% 55% 42% 58% 40% 55% 44% 
High school 
graduate 
18% 45% 51% 
51% 48% 52% 46% 47% 52% 
No high school 
diploma 
64% 35% 63% 35% 50% 49% 
Table 2: vote in presidential election according to level of education 
 
Finally, Trump’s performance with white voters is certainly strong, but again does not appear to be 
significantly different from previous Republican candidates (see Table 3). 
 
Size of 
category in 
2016 
2016 2012 2008 2004 
Clinton Trump Obama Romney Obama McCain Kerry Bush 
White 70% 37% 58% 39% 59% 43% 55% 41% 58% 
Black 12% 88% 8% 93% 6% 95% 4% 88% 11% 
Hispanic/Latino 11% 65% 29% 71% 27% 67% 31% 53% 44% 
Asian 4% 65% 29% 73% 26% 62% 35% 56% 44% 
Other 3% 56% 37% 58% 38% 66% 31% 54% 40% 
Table 3: vote in presidential election according to level of race 
There is no denying however that Trump managed to appeal to more less educated White men than 
his predecessors. While Bush and Romney appealed to 61% of the ‘white without a college degree 
electorate’, McCain 58%, Trump appealed to 67% of that category. Yet Trump’s ‘breakthrough’ is 
further nuanced by Kilibarda and Roithmayr (2016) analysis of the ‘myth of the rust belt revolt’ which 
demonstrates that Clinton actually lost more ‘white working class’ votes on Obama than Trump gained 
on Romney in 2012 (see also Henley 2016). It is also worth noting that Trump won the majority of 
white professional males with a college education and over 40% of white professional females with a 
college education, pointing further to race or ‘whiteness’ over class as a key factor, something which 
is traditional in the Republican vote. This is backed up by a Public Religion Research Institute survey 
that showed Trump’s appeal could better be explained by a fear of cultural displacement (such as the 
loss of white male Christian privilege) than real or feared economic displacement (Chokshi 2018). 
 
Interestingly, responses to supplementary questions in the exit poll suggest that, beyond the 
traditional Republican electorate or middle and upper class conservatives, Trump managed to appeal 
to a similar electorate than that which has underpinned the resurgence of the far right in Europe. This 
particular electorate feels insecure about its future, even though it remains in a relatively privileged 
position and is more interested about issues such as immigration and terrorism, than about the 
economy. Therefore, rather than a radical shift of the working class towards Trump, what we have 
witnessed is the development of a typical far right electorate by European standards (see amongst 
others Crépon, Dézé, and Mayer 2015, Rydgren 2013). While this is certainly a concerning 
development, the size of this particular electorate is marginal, and would not have been sufficient for 
Trump to win if the Democrats had managed to retain their share of the vote. A more significant 
finding is that the largest share of Trump’s electorate does not appear to differ from traditional 
Republican voters, and particularly from Bush’s. This means that Trump is more the confirmation of a 
trend which has seen a radicalisation of the Republican electorate, with racism being increasingly 
normalised in American politics, and the resurgence of the far right rather than a real break from 
politics as usual. 
 
Misusing class and its implications 
 
The first part of this article highlighted the way in which mainstream political discourse constructed a 
narrative around Brexit and Trump’s election as white working-class revolts. To challenge this 
narrative, we have used a two-pronged approach: first, we demonstrated that there is a long history 
of whitening the working class and ignoring its diversity, thus promoting an essentialist narrative 
based on white (male) experience. This led us to conclude that, while racism is indeed present in the 
working class, its diverse nature should not be ignored and the racism present in upper classes should 
not be downplayed, particularly when the so-called revolt is led by the privileged (both in terms of 
race and wealth). We then took a more electoral approach and demonstrated that the working class 
revolts for both Trump and Brexit were in fact far less obvious than the coverage of both electoral 
contests showed. The working-class nature of these two votes is marginal and can be challenged. 
 
Therefore, we see the white working class narrative as problematic in four ways. The first is that it 
racialises the working class as white and pits an elusive ‘white working class’ against racialised 
minorities and immigrants, who are denied working class status, in a competition for scarce, 
deregulated and casualised employment and ever dwindling resources in neo-liberal Britain and 
America. Second, it constructs the ‘white working class’ as privileging their racial interests above class 
ones and as being racist, which results in the very stigma right-wing populist and libertarian advocates, 
who are themselves often part of the elites, falsely and opportunistically claim to oppose. Third, it 
normalises and mainstreams racism in both discourse and practice by portraying it as a popular 
demand, thus potentially fuelling hate crime. Finally, in addition to not addressing the inequality faced 
by ‘white’ working class people, it exacerbates the inequality and vulnerability faced by racialised and 
migrant working class peoples and actually serves establishment political and economic interests. 
 
This framing of Brexit and Trump as working class revolts also informed the ways in which responses 
and reactions to them were constructed. The reaction with regard to the role played by the working 
class in the events has tended to be split into two distinct camps: those celebrating the working class 
revolts, and those lamenting the rise of racism within this part of the population. While there is no 
denying that racist sentiment is on the rise within the working class and that many voted for Trump 
and Brexit for this reason, our analysis has demonstrated that the working class quality of both votes 
is not evident and that the majority of supporters for the nativist option came from better off sections 
of the population traditionally associated with the middle class. The white working class revolt 
narrative mobilised by the populist far right and hyped by elite discourse (Glynos & Mondon 2016) has 
ignored not only elite driven racism (e.g. in politics, academia and the media) as well as the more 
structural, institutional and systemic operation of racism in our societies. For the US, this is supported 
by the analysis undertaken by Metzgar (2016) and Hubbs (2014) that ‘class-based blame-shifting (“It’s 
not us, it’s them!”) actually supports racist and other systems of oppression’. While those in positions 
of power (whether political or discursive) have often argued that they are merely responding to what 
‘the people’ want, they have carefully ignored or downplayed the role they play as gate-keepers and 
shapers of public discourse and their proven influence as agenda-setters. Therefore, rather than ‘the 
people’ suddenly reverting to racist attitudes, we argue that it is the widespread and widely publicised 
acceptance, based on skewed evidence, that ‘the people’ has turned racist, that perversely led to the 
legitimisation of a racism as it began to be discussed as a popular feeling, rather than a construction 
fuelled by elite discourse. 
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